ABSTRACT Galois/counter mode (GCM) is one of the most widely used authenticated encryptions. To date, even though some works have investigated the security against side channel analysis (SCA) in the process of GCM computation, especially GHASH function, they failed to present comprehensive SCA security in consideration of both SPA/TA and DPA/CPA aspects simultaneously. In this paper, we present a secure GCM implementation on 8-bit AVR microcontroller environments. The proposed implementation provides comprehensive SCA security in consideration of not only SPA/TA but also DPA/CPA. In order to defeat SPA/TA, we introduce the concepts of dummy XOR with garbage registers and instruction level atomicity (ILA) and also present secure binary field (BF) multiplication method using them, which runs in a constant-time and fixed pattern. We also propose an efficient multiplicative masking method which can prevent DPA/CPA when computing GHASH function in the GCM process. Through actual implementation of the proposed method on an 8-bit AVR ATmega128 microcontroller, we show that the proposed method outperforms existing alternatives while providing comprehensive SCA security. With respect to the performance of secure binary field multiplication, the proposed multiplication method outperforms the related work by around 51.86% when computing a 128-bit binary field multiplication. Regarding the overhead of the multiplicative masking method, the proposed method requires only one additional BF multiplication and negligible amount of field additions regardless of the number of input blocks, while the related work consumes around the {log(m + n + 1) + 2} number of additional BF multiplications when there are (m + n + 1) input blocks. Through SCA-related experiments, we prove the SCA security of the proposed methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authenticated encryptions (AEs) have been widely used in secure communications where confidentiality and integrity are required at the same time. Recently, AEs have gained popularity on even resource-constrained platforms including smart cards, sensor nodes, and RFIDs since they can provide both confidentiality and integrity within a single scheme rather than combining two separate encryption method and authentication method.
AES-GCM (Galois/Counter mode of operation), proposed by McGrew and Viega [1] , [2] and standardized by NIST [3] The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Yassine Maleh. in 2007, is one of the most widely used AEs in practical applications such as SSL/TLS, SSH, IPSec, IEEE 802.1 AE (MACsec), NSA suite B, IEEE 802.11ad, and so on. It consists of AES encryption in counter mode as well as authentication tag generation based on GHASH function involving multiplications in GF (2 128 ). While AES-GCM is computationally secure against existing cryptanalyses, several works conducting side channel analysis (SCA) [4] on GHASH function on GCM mode (especially targeting field multiplication of GF (2 128 ) in GHASH function) have recently been presented [5] - [7] . Since its demand is increasing for embedded devices, and since such devices are deployed in the field which can be easily captured by adversaries, secure countermeasures against SCA are fundamental requirements VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ for the implementation of AES-GCM on embedded devices. To date, there have been a number of studies devoted to analyzing SCA security on AES primitive itself as well as developing efficient and secure countermeasures. On the other hand, in recent years, researchers have realized the importance of SCA security on GHASH function (especially binary field multiplication in GF (2 128 )) and presented several attack methods [5] - [11] . In addition to attack methods, some countermeasures have been also proposed for securing GHASH of GCM. For example, Liu et al. proposed the constant-time polynomial multiplication method based on the Karatsuba technique and Masked Block-Comb (BC) method [10] , [11] . Although they achieved TA (Timing Analysis) resistance when computing binary field (BF) multiplications over GF (2 128 ) in the GHASH function, they did not consider DPA/CPA [4] , [12] security on the overall process of GHASH function (DPA and CPA denote Differential Power Analysis and Correlation Power Analysis, respectively). Most recently, Oshida et al. proposed a multiplicative masking method for defeating DPA/CPA-type SCA when computing the GHASH function [9] . Even though they achieved complete DPA/CPA security through the use of their proposed multiplicative masking method, they ignored the SPA/TA security of the underlying BF multiplications (SPA and TA denote Simple Power Analysis and Timing Analysis, respectively). Furthermore, their scheme requires a large number of field multiplications over GF (2 128 ) in order to unmask the final result before outputting it (this is called the correctness property).
In this paper, we concentrate on developing efficient SCA-resistant GCM implementation for 8-bit AVR microcontrollers which are widely used for sensor nodes, smart cards, and RFIDs. First, we review and analyze the security of the aforementioned existing SCA countermeasures [9] - [11] on the GHASH function of AES-GCM with respect to comprehensive SCA security. Secondly, we introduce concepts of Dummy XOR with garbage registers and instruction level atomicity (ILA) and present a new SPA/TA-resistant BF multiplication method based on these concepts for 8-bit AVR microcontrollers. Thirdly, we propose a multiplicative masking method for defending DPA/CPA on GHASH function. The proposed method is superior to Oshida et al's method in terms of computational overhead. Furthermore, we show through experimentation that the proposed masked GHASH function using the proposed BF multiplication method is secure against SPA/TA and DPA/CPA.
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows.
• Analyzing the weakness of the related works
We revisit the SPA security of Liu et al. ' s BF multiplication method [10] , [11] and show that their method is vulnerable to SPA, in contrast to their assertion. Through analyzing the SPA security of the BF multiplication methods used in the GHASH function and the DPA security of the process of GHASH itself, we show that considering comprehensive security regarding SPA/TA and DPA/CPA for secure GHASH function is necessary.
•
Introducing concepts of Dummy XOR with garbage registers and instruction level atomicity (ILA) and developing an SPA/TA-resistant BF multiplication method for 8-bit AVR microcontrollers
The proposed BF multiplication method is based on the Block-Comb (BC) method and the Karatsuba technique. In order to make the BC method secure against TA, we introduce instruction level atomicity (ILA), which can supplement the timing difference incurred from the use of conditional branch and jump instructions in the BC method. We also propose Dummy XOR with garbage registers in order to prevent SPA, and this makes it difficult for attackers to determine whether the actual multiplier bit is 0 or 1 while observing a power consumption trace in SPA.
• Presenting a multiplicative masked GHASH function secure against DPA/CPA analysis For defending DPA/CPA in the process of GHASH function, we present a masked GHASH function. In contrast to Oshida et al.'s method [9] requiring around the {log(m + n + 1) + 2} number of additional BF multiplications for correctness property, our method requires roughly one field addition operation per each input block as well as only one BF multiplication, regardless of the number of input blocks. Thus, our method can save around the number of {log(m + n + 1) + 1} BF multiplications compared with Oshida et al.'s method.
• Implementing the proposed BF multiplication method and masked GHASH function on an 8-bit ATmega128 microcontroller and analyzing their security with actual experiments Through actual implementation on an 8-bit AVR ATmega128 microcontroller, we show that the proposed BF multiplication method is at least 51.86% faster than Liu et al.'s method while providing SPA/TA security. We also show through SCA experiments that the proposed methods are secure against SPA/TA and DPA/CPA. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the GCM process, binary field multiplication, and its implementation methods on the 8-bit AVR environment. Section III describes the SCA target points of GHASH function and criteria for secure GHASH implementation, and also describes the existing countermeasures and their weaknesses. Section IV describes the proposed countermeasures including a secure BF multiplication method and a multiplicative masked GHASH function. Section V presents the implementation results and security analysis with actual experiments. Finally, section VI concludes this paper with suggestions for future works.
II. RELATED WORKS
In this section, we briefly review GCM mode which is our target implementation and identify which information FIGURE 1. Overview of GCM process (Consisting of CTR encryption mode and GHASH function) [1] , [3] , [8] , [9] .
needs to be protected against SCA. Then, we introduce 8-bit AVR microcontroller with respect to the number of registers, memory size, and instruction set since our software is developed on this architecture. Finally, we describe the existing binary field multiplication methods on 8-bit AVR platforms. There are mainly two kinds of multiplication methods: LUT (LookUp Table) -based methods and Block-Comb (BC)-based methods.
A. BRIEF REVIEW OF GCM MODE
GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) mode is one of the most widely used authenticated encryption methods which simultaneously provides data confidentiality and authentication within a single scheme [1] - [3] . It employs the CTR mode for encryption and the GHASH function for authentication tag generation. GHASH function uses binary field (BF) multiplication over GF (2 128 ) with an irreducible polynomial f (z) = z 128 + z 7 + z 2 + z + 1. Fig. 1 depicts the process of GCM mode. In the figure, ENC and BF_MUL refer to encryption and 128-bit BF multiplication, respectively. For each block of message, CTR encryption mode in GCM encrypts the counter and conducts bit-wise XORs the encrypted result with the corresponding message block to produce ciphertext block; the counter value is then incremented. The ciphertext is then bit-wise XORed with an accumulator of the GHASH function part in GCM, which is then multiplied with a hash key H , where H = ENC(K , 0 128 ), in GF (2 128 ). Note that if the associated data is provided, the concatenation of the associated data and the generated ciphertext is the input of the GHASH function. The concatenated input is divided into 128-bit blocks, and each block is sequentially multiplied with H . Since the BF multiplication over GF (2 128 ) is the core part of the GHASH function in GCM, it needs to be implemented both efficiently and securely.
In the process of GCM, not only must the secret key K for encryption to be protected, but so must the hash key H and the subkey S. 1 If either H or S is exposed, attackers can compute valid (i.e., forged) authentication tags for any pair of associated data and ciphertexts [9] , [13] . Thus, it is necessary to protect both H and S along with K in the process of GCM. The aim of this paper is to develop an efficient and secure countermeasure which can protect H and S against SCA.
B. 8-BIT AVR MICROCONTROLLERS
Presently, 8-bit AVR microprocessors are widely used for various applications, such as smartcards, sensor nodes in WSN, RFIDs, and so on. 8-bit AVR microcontrollers, including ATmega128, have 32 general-purpose registers (R 31 , . . . , R 1 , R 0 ), with six of them being used for memory address pointers (Each pair of (R 26 , R 27 ), (R 28 , R 29 ), and (R 30 , R 31 ) are aliased as X , Y , and Z pointer registers, respectively) [14] . AVR microprocessors have separate memory areas and buses for program and data in a simple single-issue pipeline, because they are based on the Harvard architecture. They have a total of 133 instructions, and each instruction typically has a fixed latency. For example, the arithmetic/ logical instructions (e.g. ADD (arithmetic add), EOR (bit-wise XOR), LSL (logical shift left), and so on) are executed in a single clock cycle, while the memory access instructions (e.g. LD (load from memory to register), ST (store from register to memory), and so on) take two clock cycles [14] . Note that conditional branch instructions such as BREQ (branch if equal), SBRS (skip if bit in register is set), and so on consume different numbers of clock cycle(s) depending on whether the condition is true or false. 2 in case of 8-bit ATmega128, it has only 4 Kbytes of RAM and 128 Kbytes of ROM, and it runs at 7.3728 MHz. In contrast to the latest x86 CPUs and ARM processors supporting carryless multipliers, which are generic multipliers for binary field multiplication, AVR microcontrollers still do not contain the dedicated hardware for carryless multiplication.
C. BINARY FIELD MULTIPLICATION ON 8-BIT AVR PLATFORMS
The core operation required for the GHASH function of GCM is the Binary Field (BF) multiplication with an input operand as an associated data block or ciphertext block and a secret constant element H . To date, many studies for optimizing the BF multiplication on 8-bit AVR platforms have been conducted [15] - [21] . They can mainly be divided into two categories: LUT (LookUp Table) -based methods [15] - [18] and Block-Comb (BC)-based methods [19] - [21] . The results of the existing methods are summarized in Table 1 and the detail will be described in Sec. II-C2 and Sec. II-C3. Since the number of available registers is limited on 8-bit AVR (only 26 general purpose registers, except for 6 memory address pointer registers, are available), a number of memory accesses occur when computing a BF multiplication. For example, at least 64 registers are required to hold an entire set of a multiplicand, a multiplier, and a result of the BF multiplication over GF (2 128 ). However, since only 26 registers are available, only certain parts of the operands can be maintained in the registers, which results in a number of redundant memory accesses. Thus, the main concern of studies on the BF multiplication on 8-bit AVR microcontrollers is to minimize the number of redundant memory accesses by optimizing the use of the available registers.
Before describing our proposed BF multiplication method, this section briefly describes the existing BF multiplication methods and certain notations on 8-bit AVR platforms. While the LtR Comb method scans a multiplier from MSB (Most Significant Bit) to LSB (Least Significant Bit), the RtL Comb method proceeds from LSB to MSB [15] , [23] .
Throughout the paper, we will use the following notations. R i refers to the i-th general purpose register where [11] , [24] which was originally proposed for the BF multiplication over binary elliptic curves [15] , [23] .
López et al.'s LUT-based BF multiplication method is an extension of the LtR Comb method (so-called wLtR Comb method), and it executes the BF multiplication by w-bit unit rather than single bit unit at the expense of a precomputation table, which results in a reduced the number of bit operations, such as shift and XOR operations [15] , [17] , [23] , [24] . It first builds a precomputation table involving all possible results of A · u(z) for all polynomials u(z) of degree at most w − 1. It then scans multiplier B by w-bit unit at a time from MSB to LSB and takes the corresponding value from the precomputation table, and the value is XORed with the intermediate result without computing it. On 8-bit AVR platforms, it is known that 4-bit is the optimal width w for LUT-based method, which requires 16 × m-bit of RAM memory for accommodating a table composed of 16 polynomials from 0 · A to (z 3 + z 2 + z + 1) · A. The LUT-based method has been widely implemented on 8-bit AVR platforms [16] - [18] . For example, Seo et al. [16] implemented the 163-bit polynomial multiplication with NesC language on an 8-bit ATmega128 microcontroller, and they improved the original LUT-based method by reducing the number of redundant memory accesses by combining two iterations of the main loop into one. They achieved 21.1% of performance improvement and got 19,670 cc for a field multiplication over GF (2 163 ). In [17] , [18] , Aranha et al. introduced a rotating register mechanism which could significantly reduce the number of memory accesses required by the LUT-based polynomial multiplication method. They implemented their method in Assembly language and achieved timings of 4,508 cc, 8,314 cc, and 11,727 cc in computing each polynomial multiplication over GF (2 163 ), GF(2 233 ), and GF(2 271 ), respectively (cc means clock cycle). While LUT-based methods provide good performance and are secure against TA and SPA, they are inherently vulnerable to side channel analysis (SCA) using memory-address information [11] , [25] due to the huge number of memory accesses they involve. In [10] , [11] , Liu et al. [11] successfully attacked López et al.'s LUT-based BF method with a kind of horizontal correlation analysis [26] . They could find the LUT index by using the correlation between power consumption patterns for constructing the LUT and accessing the LUT during the actual multiplication.
3) BLOCK-COMB METHOD
As an alternative to LUT-based methods, the BlockComb (BC) method was first introduced in [19] for the efficient BF multiplication of η T pairing computation on the 8-bit ATmega128 microcontroller. In the BC method, a multiplier and a multiplicand are divided into equal-sized blocks of s-bytes, and partial products of multiplicand blocks and multiplier blocks are computed in a column-wise fashion. The partial product is then computed using the Comb method for efficiency. In other words, in the BC method, the available registers are divided into three parts: s registers for a block-sized multiplicand, s registers for a block-sized multiplier, and 2s + 1 for the result of partial products. Since the intermediate results are maintained in 2s + 1 working registers, the results of partial products belonging to the same column can be directly updated to the registers without needing to access memory, which reduces the number of redundant memory accesses. In [19] , Shirase et al. concluded that the optimal block size s is 6 based on (4s + 1) < 26. The original BC computes a polynomial multiplication over GF (2 239 ) within 9,511 clock cycles (cc).
Seo et al. [20] extended the size of the block from 6 to 7 in proposing the Unbalanced Block-Comb method (UBC) for GF (2 163 ) multiplication. They took advantage of the fact that the tested bits of a multiplier are no longer necessary during the process of a partial product, and recycled this register for holding the most significant byte of the multiplicand. As a result, the extended block size reduces the number of partial products from 16 to 9 when computing a polynomial multiplication over GF (2 163 ) (Note that 7-word (resp. 6-word) block size divides 163-bit polynomial into three blocks (resp. four blocks)). UBC could compute a field multiplication over GF (2 163 ) with 4, 546. Then, Seo et al. [21] proposed the Karatsuba Block-Comb method (KBC), developed by combining the Karatsuba technique with Block-Comb, which reduces the number of partial products further from 9 to 6 at the expense of several cheap field additions when computing a polynomial multiplication over GF (2 163 ). KBC could achieve 3,274 cc for a field multiplication over GF (2 163 ). They also presented a variant of constant-time Karatsuba block comb method. Even though it achieved timing attack (TA) resistance, it is still vulnerable to simple power analysis (SPA). Most recently, Seo et al. [22] presented an enhanced Karatsuba BlockComb (EKBC) method by proposing novel multiplier encoding technique which can significantly reduce the number of required registers for maintaining the multiplier. They achieved a new speed record for elliptic curve scalar multiplication over NIST-compliant K-233 curve. Until now, EKBC provides the fastest computation timing for binary field multiplication. In 2018, Seo et al. [10] , Liu et al. [11] presented a secure GCM implementation on 8-bit AVR processor. For SPA and TA resistance, they presented a masked Block-Comb method. However, in contrast to their assertion, their method is still vulnerable to SPA. We will show the SPA weakness of their method in Sec. III in detail. In summary, since BC-based methods do not use a Look-Up Table, they are secure against a kind of horizontal CPA used for attacking López et al.'s LUT-based method.
III. SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACK ON GHASH OF GCM
Recently presented attacks have mainly focused on the BF multiplication in the GHASH function [5] - [11] and their goal has been to recover the secret hash key H in order to forge the authentication tag. Among the aforementioned studies, [10] , [11] considered SPA/TA security of BF multiplication primitive itself and [5] - [7] , [9] investigated the DPA/CPA security of the BF multiplication in the process of GHASH. VOLUME 7, 2019 A. SCA TARGET POINTS AND CRITERIA FOR SECURE GCM IMPLEMENTATION From the above-mentioned studies, the SCA target points to the GHASH function can be summarized as follows.
• Target of SPA/TA If A · H , a BF (Binary Field) multiplication in GHASH, is computed with an algorithm in which its execution path depends on the multiplier, it leaks information regarding the multiplier. For example, if the Shift-andAdd method is used for a BF multiplication, as in [9] , the multiplicand is bit-wise XORed on the accumulator when the tested bit of the multiplier is set to 1. In other words, the timing differences and power consumption pattern during the execution of the method can be exploited by attackers.
⇒ Therefore, the BF multiplication in GHASH needs to both execute in constant-time and generate a regular power consumption pattern regardless of the bit value of the multiplier.
• Target of DPA/CPA One of the inputs to the BF multiplications in GHASH is a known value, as associated data A or ciphertext C, while the other input is fixed and secret hash key H . Therefore, attackers can apply DPA/CPA-type attacks during the process of GHASH function in order to find the hash key H . 
B. SECURITY OF THE EXISTING COUNTERMEASURES
Regarding the secure implementation of GCM, several works have been conducted [9] - [11] . In this subsection, we examine the claimed SCA security of the existing methods. Seo et al. [10] and Liu et al. [11] proposed the constanttime BF multiplication based on the Karatsuba technique and the Block-Comb (BC) method. In their paper, they showed that López et al.'s LUT-based BF multiplication method is vulnerable to a kind of horizontal CPA [26] exploiting its inherent consecutive memory accesses, even though it is known to be secure against TA and SPA. The BC-based BF multiplication methods are known to be secure against this kind of SCA because they do not use Look-Up Tables. However, the BC-based methods are vulnerable to Timing Attack (TA) and Simple Power Analysis (SPA), because the partial products in the BC-based methods are computed using either the LtR Comb method or the RtL Comb method. In other words, in both the LtR Comb method and the RtL Comb method, the multiplicand is XORed with the accumulator only when the tested bit value of the multiplier is set to 1. Thus, the power consumption pattern or timing difference during the computation of the BC-based methods can reveal the value of the multiplier. In order to defend TA, NOP instruction or XORing with zero register can be used. 3 However, even though both approaches make BC method run in constant-time, Liu et al. pointed out that the routines using NOP instruction or XORing with zero register consume relatively lower power consumption than normal XOR operations conducted when the tested bit is set to 1 due to the different hamming weights and instructions, which results in being vulnerable to SPA [11] . Therefore, in order to prevent not only SPA/TA but also SCA exploiting correlation between memory access patterns and hamming weights of operands, they eventually proposed a Masked Block-Comb (MBC) method which runs in constant-time and always executes the same execution pattern, regardless of the value of multiplier. for m = 3 to 0 do 3:
for k = 3 to 0 do 6:
end for 8: end for
9:
C ← C 1 10: end for 11: (Return C) Alg. 1 shows the masked BC method from [10] , [11] . However, this algorithm does not show a regular power consumption pattern in contrast to their assertion, so it does not guarantee SPA resistance. In the case in which the tested bit is set (resp. clear), BIT becomes 1 (resp. 0), then 0xFF (resp. 0x00) is assigned to MASK . Consequently, (B[k]&0xFF) (resp. (B[k]&0x00)) is bit-wise XORed with the accumulator C[k + m] when the tested bit is set (resp. clear). Since (B[k]&0x00) is the same as 0x00, this is identical to XORing the accumulator with zero register. Therefore, we found that the power consumption pattern of Alg. 1 presented in [10] , [11] is similar to that using XORing with zero register. Furthermore, Liu et al. did not consider DPA/CPA security on the overall process of the GHASH function.
Recently, Oshida et al. proposed the first DPA/CPA countermeasure based on multiplicative masking for the purpose of securing the GHASH function [9] against the previouslypresented DPA scenarios [5] - [7] . Fig. 2 shows Oshida et al.'s masked GHASH function. First, the input block (A 1 ) is masked with (M ⊕ S), where M is a 128-bit random masking value and S is the subkey. Then, the masked input value as (A 1 ⊕M ⊕S) is multiplied with the hash key H , and the result of the multiplication is XORed with (S ⊕ S · H ). Note that by XORing the output of i-th BF_MUL with (S ⊕ S · H ), the updated result always becomes masked with (M · H i ⊕ S). Although they achieved complete DPA/CPA security, they ignored SPA/TA security on the BF multiplication method used in the GHASH function. Since they used the Shiftand-Add method as described in Alg. 6 in the Appendix for computing BF multiplications in GHASH, the timing difference or power consumption pattern during the multiplications can leak the secret information. Furthermore, their scheme requires a large number of field multiplications over GF (2 128 ) in order to unmask the final result before outputting it (this is called the correctness property). In other words, it requires the computation of (M · H m+n+1 ) in order to unmask the final result for the correctness property, which requires (log(m + n + 1) + 2) binary field multiplications. Oshida et al.' mentioned that the value of H m+n+1 can be precomputed prior to conducting the GHASH function. However, the precomputed H m+n+1 can be reused only when the number of input blocks is (m + n + 1). For example, if H 10 is precomputed, it can only be used without any additional cost when the number of input blocks on the GHASH function is 10. However, since the number of input blocks in the GHASH function is not practically fixed, precomputing H m+n+1 does not always provide a computational advantage, in contrast to their assertion.
In Section V, we analyze the security of 
IV. PROPOSED SECURE GCM COMPUTATION
In this section, we describe the proposed techniques for a secure GHASH function in terms of SPA/TA and DPA/CPA. In Section III, we define design criteria for the secure implementation of GHASH in order to achieve comprehensive SCA security. According to the design criteria, first, the BF multiplication in GHASH needs to not only execute in constant-time but also generate a regular power consumption pattern. Secondly, the known input value such as associated data or ciphertext needs to be randomized with a proper masking value so as to block attackers from correctly guessing the intermediate result of GHASH.
A. PROPOSED BINARY FIELD MULTIPLICATION
In a manner identical to the Masked Block Comb method presented in [10] , [11] , we basically make use of the 32-bit wise Block-Comb (BC) method. In order to compute a BF multiplication over GF (2 128 ), each operand of the multiplication is divided into four blocks, and each partial product of the divided multiplicands and multipliers is computed using the 32-bit wise RtL Comb method. Alg. 2 computes a partial product of a 32-bit multiplicand and a 32-bit multiplier in an RtL Comb fashion in the BC-based BF multiplication method. In Alg. 2, the multiplicand A is bit-wise XORed with the intermediate result C when the tested bit of the multiplier B is set to 1. Otherwise, no operation is performed. Thus, it is vulnerable to TA and SPA. The first goal of this paper is to convert Alg. 2 into a secure version, which not R l ← 0 3: end for 4: for l = 0 to 3 do 5:
for m = 0 to 3 do 11: if the l-th bit of R 13+m == 1 then 12: for k = 0 to 4 do 13:
end for 15: end if 16: end for 17: if l = 7 then only executes in a constant time but also generates a regular power consumption pattern. In order to defend TA and SPA, we introduce the concepts of Dummy XOR with the garbage registers and Instruction Level Atomicity (ILA), then apply them to the BC method.
1) DUMMY XOR WITH GARBAGE REGISTERS FOR REGULAR POWER CONSUMPTION PATTERN
In Section III, we show that the power consumption pattern in Liu et al.'s MBC method depends on the value of the tested multiplier bit even though identical operations are executed regardless of the bit value (Section V presents the experimental results regarding the SPA security on Liu et al. ' 
s method). This is because zero values ((B[k]&MASK )) are XORed with
the accumulator C when the tested value is zero, which is identical to the method of XORing with a zero register. Thus, we introduce the concept of Dummy XOR with the garbage registers to prevent SPA. We double the number of registers for the accumulator C from (R 7 , . . . , R 0 ) to (R 15 , . . . , R 0 ). Our method using the double-sized accumulator completely makes use of the 25 registers for computing a partial product of 32-bit operands, and this is acceptable in 8-bit AVR microcontrollers, where 32 registers are available. Figure 3 shows the register assignment in the proposed method. The set of (R 0 , . . . , R 7 ) plays the garbage registers and the set of (R 8 , . . . , R 15 ) contains the real intermediate result of the partial products. Our method executes XOR operations not with zero values, but with the real multiplicand regardless of the value of tested bit; however, the destination of the operations needs to be correctly configured. For example, when the tested bit is 0, the (R m+k ← R m+k ⊕ R 16+k ) is computed where k = 0 to 4. Otherwise, (R 8+m+k ← R 8+m+k ⊕ R 16+k ) is computed. Since the real multiplicand is XORed with the accumulator in both cases, the power consumption patterns of both cases are indistinguishable with SPA.
2) INSTRUCTION LEVEL ATOMICITY FOR CONSTANT-TIME EXECUTION
If we implement the proposed Dummy XOR using the garbage registers with if-then-else statements, this leaks the timing difference. For example, the naive Dummy XOR method can be implemented as following.
if the l-th bit of R 21+m == 1 then for k = 0 to 4 do R 8+m+k ← R 8+m+k ⊕ R 16+k end for else for k = 0 to 4 do R m+k ← R m+k ⊕ R 16+k end for end if Even though the above codes execute the same operations as (R 8+m+k ← R 8+m+k ⊕R 16+k ) or (R m+k ← R m+k ⊕R 16+k ) regardless of the tested bit value, it leaks the timing difference. This is because of the if-then-else conditional branches. On the 8-bit AVR architecture, the conditional branch instructions inherently consume different clock cycles based on whether or not the condition is true. For example, if the condition is false (resp. true), they usually consume 1 clock cycle (resp. 2 clock cycles). Thus, even though the inner operation patterns in the if and else clauses are identical, it can incur a timing difference, which results in vulnerability to TA. Thus, we need to address this problem to develop a constant-time BF multiplication method which is secure against TA. Fig. 4 shows the assembly level implementation of the Dummy XOR method with the garbage registers and its execution time in clock cycles. The conditional branch in the BC method is implemented with an SBRS (Skip if bit in register is set) instruction [14] , [19] . As shown in the figure, the core part of the BC method using the Dummy XOR technique is implemented with the SBRS, RJMP, and EOR instructions. SBRS tests whether or not the 1-st bit of R 21 is set. If the tested bit is false, SBRS consumes 1 clock cycle and the next instruction is executed. For example, when the tested bit is clear, the program counter (PC). 4 jumps to the label of l_1_m0_Dummy with RJMP and then the multiplicand is XORed with the garbage registers through the five Dummy EOR instructions. When the tested bit is set, SBRS consumes 2 clock cycles and the next instruction is skipped. Thus, the multiplicand is XORed with the real accumulator registers through the five EOR instructions. Thus, the naive implementation of the Dummy XOR technique is vulnerable to TA. Furthermore, the timing difference makes it so that the two conditional cases are distinguishable from each other with SPA. Therefore, we need to ensure that the two conditional cases use the same kinds of instructions at the same time.
We define the concept of Instruction Level Atomicity (ILA), which makes it so that the two execution paths use the same kinds of instructions at the same time. In order to design instruction level atomicity, we analyze the internal processes of the SBRS and RJMP instructions in detail. The SBRS (Skip if Bit in Register is Set) instruction increments the program counter (PC) by 1 (resp. 2) when the condition is false (resp. true). In other words, since the PC is incremented by 1 when the condition is false, the next instruction is executed. On the other hand, when the condition is true, the PC is updated as PC+2, which results in executing the second instruction by skipping the first instruction from SBRS. Thus, the main work of SBRS is to increment the PC according to the result of the testing condition. When updating the PC, the adder in ALU is used. In other words, when the condition is false (resp. true), the adder is executed once (resp. twice), which requires 1 clock cycle (resp. 2 clock cycles). Therefore, it can be found that the execution of the SBRS instruction is the same as adding 1 to the PC register once or twice with the ADD instruction. The RJMP (Relative Jump) instruction updates the PC by PC+k + 1 where k is the displacement, and it takes 2 clock cycles for its execution. RJMP also uses the adder in ALU twice for updating the PC as PC ← PC + 1 and PC ← PC + k. Based on the above VOLUME 7, 2019 analysis, we can conclude that the primary operation of the SBRS and RJMP instructions is to update the PC with the adder in ALU, which is identical to the execution of the ADD instruction. Therefore, we make use of the ADD instruction in order to make two execution cases (the case when the condition is false and the case when the condition is true) indistinguishable from each other. Fig. 5 shows the proposed instruction level atomicity for making two execution cases indistinguishable with respect to the types of instructions and execution cycles. Since the displacement k is seven in the proposed method, R T register holding 0x07 is added to R 0 register belonging to the garbage registers (In the proposed method, R 25 can be used as R T ). We determine that two execution cases consume the same number of clock cycles as 10, and the type of instruction at each clock cycle is identical. Thus, our method is secure against TA and SPA.
Alg. 3 shows the proposed BC method on 32-bit operands by combining the proposed Dummy XOR with the garbage registers and ILA. Alg. 3 executes a partial product of 32-bit operands, and is secure against TA and SPA through the application of Dummy XOR using the garbage registers and instruction level atomicity using a dummy addition. If the tested multiplier bit is set (that is, if the condition is true), the multiplicand is XORed with the real accumulator consisting of registers (R 15 , . . . , R 8 ) after the dummy add instruction is executed. Otherwise (the condition is false), Dummy XOR is executed by XORing the multiplicand with the garbage registers (R 7 , . . . , R 0 ). The core parts in Alg. 3 as steps 10-25 and steps 26-38 are implemented in a loop unrolling manner as codes depicted in Fig. 5 .
3) APPLICATION OF KARATSUBA TECHNIQUE
Since the proposed BC method computes a partial product of 32-bit operands, the 128-bit BF multiplication requires 16 partial products. Thus, we apply the Karatsuba technique so as to reduce the number of partial products for efficiency. The Karatsuba technique allows us to reduce the number of partial products in sub-quadratic complexity with a few additional field additions [27] , [28] . Rather than directly applying the Karatsuba technique, we apply multiple levels of the Karatsuba technique: 1-level Karatsuba for computing a 64-bit multiplication requiring three 32-bit partial products and 2-level Karatsuba for computing a 128-bit multiplication requiring three 64-bit partial products. Thus, the proposed 128-bit BF multiplication requires nine 32-bit wise partial products, rather than sixteen in total.
Alg. 4 shows the proposed 1-level Karatsuba BC method for 64-bit operands, and it requires three 32-bit wise partial products (denoted as × 32−bit ) which are computed using Alg. 3. Note that the shift operations of (H 64) and (M 32) at step 5 can be efficiently computed by arranging the byte positions rather than using the bit-shift operations. The 2-level Karatsuba BC method for computing a 128-bit BF multiplication can be constituted in a manner similar to Alg. 4 with the difference being that the size of operands increases from 64-bit to 128-bit. The 2-level Karatsuba BC method requires three 64-bit partial products and the partial products are computed with Alg. 4 .
We have implemented the proposed BC methods on an 8-bit AVR ATmega128 microcontroller running on 7.3728 MHz. 
R 21+l ← B[l] 8: end for 9: R 20 ← 0 10: // Processing from 0-th bit to 6-th bit 11: for l = 0 to 6 do 12: for m = 0 to 3 do 13: if the l-th bit of R 21+m == 1 then
14:
R 0 ← R 0 + R 25 // Dummy ADD instruction for ILA 15: for k = 0 to 4 do 16:
end for 18: else 19: // Dummy XOR with the garbage registers 20: for k = 0 to 4 do 21: R m+k ← R m+k ⊕ R 16+k
22:
end for 23: end if 24: end for 25: (R 20 , . . . , R 16 ) ← (R 20 , . . . , R 16 ) 1 26: end for 27: // Processing the final 7-th bit 28: for m = 0 to 3 do 29: if the 7-th bit of R 21+m == 1 then
30:
R 0 ← R 0 + R 25 // Dummy ADD instruction for ILA 31: for k = 0 to 4 do 32:
end for 34: else 35: // Dummy XOR with the garbage registers 36: for k = 0 to 4 do 
The 64-bit BF multiplication includes codes of three 32-bit wise BF multiplications and other operations rather than calling the function of the 32-bit wise BF multiplication. The 128-bit BF multiplication is implemented in C language, and it internally calls the 64-bit wise BF multiplication implemented in AVR assembly language.
4) REDUCTION AND BIT REFLECTION
The GCM standard specifies that the bits of the state are reflected [1] , [2] . That is, in the GCM standard, with respect to an element over GF (2 128 ), the leftmost bit is regarded as the 0-th bit and the rightmost bit is regarded as the 127-th bit, while general cryptographic algorithms usually use the opposite notation. We utilize the table-based bitreflection for the inputs and the output of a BF multiplication (The table for , and vice versa. The bit-reflection is required for each BF multiplication of the GHASH function. In the process of the GHASH function, the result of each BF multiplication needs to be reduced by the irreducible polynomial f (z) = z 128 + z 7 + z 2 + z + 1. We have implemented a fast reduction method similar to the fast reduction methods in [23] , computing byteunit reduction rather than bit-unit, and using f (z) = z 128 + z 7 + z 2 + z + 1 for 8-bit AVR microcontrollers in C language.
B. MASKED GHASH COMPUTATION
While the proposed BF multiplication method is secure against TA and SPA, it is still vulnerable to DPA/CPA. Thus, this section describes our approach to preventing DPA/CPA. In order to defend DPA/CPA, the power consumption leakage needs to be independent from the processed data (i.e. intermediate results) during the crypto operations. In detail, if a constant secret value as a subkey or a hash key is mixed with varying inputs as blocks of associated data or blocks of ciphertext, DPA/CPA can be launched at the GHASH function. Thus, we propose a multiplicative masking approach with which to randomize both the inputs and the intermediate results during the process of the GHASH function. Fig. 6 shows the process of the proposed masked GHASH function. At the first BF multiplication, the input A 1 is XORed 
FIGURE 6.
Proposed Masked GHASH function process (M, S, and H denote a 128-bit random masking value, a subkey derived from encrypting (IV ||CTR 0 ) with a master key K , and a hash key derived from encrypting 0 128 with the master key K . BF_MUL denotes a 128-bit BF multiplication).
with (M ⊕ S)
, where M is a 128-bit random masking value and S is a subkey derived from encrypting (IV ||CTR 0 ) with a master key K . Note that a random value M needs to be newly generated at the beginning of the GHASH function. Since the input value is masked with a random value, the power consumption becomes independent from the processed data of BF_MUL, which makes it so that attackers cannot correctly guess the intermediate value. The output of BF_MUL is XORed with (S ⊕ M ) · (H ⊕ 1). Since the output of the first BF_MUL is ((M ⊕S⊕A 1 )·H ), the result of
In the original GHASH function without any DPA/CPA countermeasures, the output of the first BF multiplication is (A 1 ·H ). As a result, it can be found that the original output of BF_MUL is XORed with (M ⊕ S). Then, the masked output of the first BF_MUL is XORed with the input (A 2 ) of the second BF_MUL, which once again randomizes the input of BF_MUL. This process is iterated until each of the (m + n + 1) blocks is computed by BF_MUL. As shown in Fig. 6 , both the input and the output of BF_MUL are masked with random masking values, which guarantees resistance against DPA/CPA during the process of the GHASH function. The output of the final BF_MUL needs to be XORed with (S ⊕ S · H ⊕ M · H ) rather than (S ⊕ M ) · (H ⊕ 1) for correctness property. Alg. 5 shows the detailed execution process of the proposed GHASH function. The input consists of m + n + 1 segments (segments mean blocks in this context): m segments of the additional associated data, n segments of ciphertext, and a segment of (m||n). Whenever this GHASH function is invoked, a new 128-bit random value needs to be generated at step 1, which is then XORed with the subkey S at step 2. 
T ← T ⊕ V 10: end for // Processing the final segment
Steps 3-5 compute V and U where V will be XORed with the output of each BF_MUL except for the final BF_MUL and U will be XORed with the final output of the GHASH function. Steps 6-10 process m + n input segments by calling BF_MUL iteratively. By XORing the output of i-th BF_MUL where 1 ≤ i ≤ m + n with V , the output becomes dated as being always masked with (M ⊕S). The final output of the GHASH function is XORed with U and then the authentication tag is returned. Note that by XORing U to the final output of the GHASH function, the random value M is removed from the output, which preserves the correctness property. Table 5 compares the performance of the proposed masking method with Oshida et al.'s method. As mentioned previously in Sec. III-B, Oshida et al.'s method requires {log(m + n+1)+2} BF_MULs and (m+n+5) BF_ADDs for correctness property. Oshida et al. mentioned that log(m + n + 1) of BF_MULs can be saved by precomputing H m+n+1 prior to executing the GHASH function. However, since the number of input blocks in the GHASH function can vary, precomputing H m+n+1 does not always provide a computational advantage, in contrast to their assertion. However, the proposed masking method depicted in Alg. 5 requires additional overhead of (m + n + 3) BF_ADDs + (1) BF_MUL, which significantly reduces the number of the BF multiplications compared to Oshida et al.'s. Furthermore, since the cost for computing BF_ADD is much smaller than that for computing BF_MUL, the additional overhead from the proposed method is negligible compared with the original overhead for the GHASH computation itself. In the next section, we show the proposed countermeasure is resistant against DPA/CPA through experiments.
V. IMPLEMENTATION RESULT AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, firstly we compare the performance of the proposed secure BF multiplication method with those of the existing BF multiplication methods. Next, we compare the SCA security of the proposed GHASH function with that of the existing implementations of the GHASH function in terms of SPA/TA and DPA/CPA, respectively. For analyzing the performance and SCA Security, we have implemented AES-GCM software using our proposed BF multiplication method and DPA/CPA-resistant GHASH function on an SCARF SCA evaluation board [29] equipped with 8-bit ATmega128 microcontroller. Table 4 compares the cost and security of the proposed secure BF multiplication method with those of the existing methods. Oshida et al. used the Shift-and-Add method in order to compute the BF multiplications in the GHASH function [9] . However, they did not present the timing cost for computing the BF multiplications in their paper. Thus, we have implemented the Shift-and-Add method as described in Alg. 6 on an 8-bit ATmega128 microcontroller in C language and measured the performance. Since the Shift-and-Add method does not provide constant-timing, we have measured the average timing of 100 executions, and determined that it costs 31,971 cc. Even though the Shift-and-Add method does not require bitreflection of the input operands and its structure is simple, it requires a number of bit-wise SHIFT and XOR instructions compared with the Comb-based methods, as described in Section II-C. Liu et al. presented the timing cost of their 128-bit BF multiplication method (named as Karatsuba MBC method) on an 8-bit AVR ATxmega128a1 microcontroller at Section 6 in their paper as 14,878 cc, including the cost for modular reduction [11] . Even though Liu et al. ' s method provides constant-timing execution, it is vulnerable to SPA, as will be presented in the next section. We have implemented the proposed 128-bit BF multiplication method described in Section 2 on an 8-bit ATmega128 microcontroller. The cost of the proposed 128-bit BF multiplication method is 7,162 cc, which includes the overhead for bit-reflection and modular reduction (the cost for the 128-bit BF multiplication itself is 5,675 cc, as described in Table 2 ). The proposed method provides substantially improved performance by about 51.86% as compared with Liu et al.'s method while also providing security against TA and SPA. The codes for bit-reflection and modular reduction are implemented in C language. Thus, we expect that further improvement can be possible if they are implemented in AVR assembly language.
A. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

B. SIDE CHANNEL SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the SCA security of the proposed BF multiplication method and the GHASH function. We also analyze the SCA security of the existing methods and compare them with that of our methods. For experiments, we have implemented three AES-GCM softwares: the first one using Liu et al.'s method, the second one using Oshida et al.'s method, and the final one using our methods on an SCARF SCA evaluation board [29] using 8-bit ATmega128 microcontroller, according to Table 5 . The power consumption signal is captured at a 250MS/s sampling rate by LeCroy HDO6104A oscilloscope and then is low-pass filtered with 150MHz cutoff frequency. Actually, we have gathered power traces of overall AES-GCM execution and extracted subset of target points from the power traces. Note that since Liu et al. did not consider the DPA/CPA security of the GHASH function in their work, we use the original GHASH function without the DPA/CPA countermeasures for experimentation.
1) VALIDITY OF INSTRUCTION LEVEL ATOMICITY
As aforementioned in Section IV-A2, SBRS used in the BC method consumes different numbers of clock cycles depending on whether or not the tested bit is true. Thus, we use a dummy ADD instruction when the tested bit is true in order to eliminate the timing difference as compared to the false case. The reason why we make use of ADD rather than other AVR instructions is to make the True case indistinguishable from the False case with respect to SPA. Since the main goal of SBRS and RJMP is to update the PC (Program Counter) by adding the displacement value to the PC itself, the ADD instruction is the most appropriate for the dummy instruction. 
2) SPA SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to analyze SPA security, we gather a power consumption trace of each BF multiplication method shown in Table 5 by using a LECROY HDO06104A oscilloscope with 5 GS/s. Fig. 8 shows the power consumption trace of the Shift-andAdd method used in Oshida et al.'s GHASH function. In the figure, each black box includes the power consumption of each iteration of Alg. 6 in Appendix. The power consumption in a black box is divided into five distinct areas, and it can be found that when the multiplier bit is 1, the width of the first area is wider than that when the multiplier bit is 0. Thus, it can be found that the Shift-and-Add method used in Oshida et al.'s GHASH function is vulnerable to SPA.
In order to compare the proposed BF multiplication method with Liu et al.'s method, we make the two methods operate on the same operands. Fig. 9 shows the power consumption trace of Liu et al.'s BF multiplication method. In the figure, the power consumption of each iteration of the outer loop (from l = 7 to 0) in Alg. 1 is plotted in four consecutive black boxes. In other words, the power consumption in each black box is for computing each iteration of the inner loop (from m = 3 to 0) in Alg. 1. Note that since at the end of each iteration of the outer loop the accumulator C is leftshifted, the width of the fourth in successive four boxes is wider than that of the others. The power trace in the red box of the figure on the left side is magnified into the figure on the right side. As shown in the figure, when the multiplier bit is 1, there are several peaks at the right side of black box, otherwise there is no peak. Thus, the power consumption pattern when the multiplier bit is set can be clearly distinguishable from that when the multiplier bit is clear, resulting in vulnerability to SPA. This experimental result supports our security analysis on Liu et al.'s method described in Section III-B. Fig. 10 shows the power consumption trace of the proposed BF multiplication method. From the figure, it can be found that the power consumption when the multiplier bit is set is indistinguishable from that when the multiplier bit is clear, which ensures SPA-resistance. With the use of dummy registers and Instruction Level Atomicity (ILA), the proposed BF multiplication preserves the execution uniformity.
We have additionally checked that the proposed Instruction Level Atomicity (ILA) cannot be attacked with clustering algorithms such as K-Means [30] , Spectral clustering [31] , and so on. We have first classified the traces for assembly VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 10. SPA on the proposed BF multiplication method (the value 0 or 1 in each black box means the tested bit value of the multiplier. The power trace in the red box of the figure on the left side is magnified into the figure on the right side). codes in Fig. 5 into those for True case and False case assuming that the condition is known. With 5,000 traces for True case and 5,000 traces for False case, we have carried out the most widely used clustering algorithms: K-Means [30] , Mean-Shift [32] , DBSCAN [33] , Spectral clustering [31] , Birch [34] , and Agglomerative clustering [35] , [36] . In our experiments, two clustering algorithms K-Means and Spectral clustering have the highest success rates as 0.6109 and 0.6205, respectively. However, even though the probability that attackers are able to exactly guesses each bit of hash key H is 0.6205, the entropy of 128-bit H is log 2 0.6205 −128 = 88.128 and it is still too high for attackers to find the hash key H in AES-GCM, which ensures the proposed method provides our claimed SCA security. Thus, our countermeasure can provide the practical security against various clustering techniques.
3) DPA/CPA SECURITY ANALYSIS
In order to analyze the DPA/CPA security, we gather 100,000 power consumption traces of each GHASH function in Table 3 , the proposed GHASH function using the proposed BF multiplication method and the original GHASH FIGURE 12. CPA on the proposed GHASH function using the proposed BF multiplication method (gray plots mean the correlations of wrong keys and the black plot means the correlation of a correct key). function using Liu et al.'s BF method, by using LECROY HDO06104A oscilloscope with 500 MS/s. Since the DPA/CPA security of Oshida et al. ' s method has been proven in their work [9] , we omit conducting DPA/CPA on Oshida et al.'s masked GHASH function. Fig. 11 shows correlations from conducting CPA on the original GHASH function using Liu et al.'s BF multiplication method. From the figure, it can be found that the only correct key, denoted by black has a higher correlation than any other correlations of wrong keys, denoted by gray. This result is apparent because Liu et al.'s work does not consider DPA/CPA security in the process of the GHASH function. Fig. 12 shows the correlation result from executing CPA on the proposed GHASH function using the proposed BF multiplication method. As shown in the figure, the correlation of the correct key is indistinguishable from the other correlations of the wrong keys, which shows the security of the proposed method against DPA/CPA. From the experiments of SPA and DPA/CPA, comprehensive SCA security is required to achieve secure GCM implementation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a SCA-resistant GCM implementation for 8-bit AVR microcontroller environments. In recent years, researchers have realized the importance of SCA security on the GHASH function in the GCM mode and presented several attack methods. Even though several works have investigated developing SCA countermeasures for secure GHASH function, they failed to provide comprehensive SCA security against SPA/TA and DPA/CPA. In contrast to the existing methods, the proposed implementation provides comprehensive SCA and the proposed countermeasures are efficient in terms of computational cost. Since the binary field multiplications in GF (2 128 ) are the core operations in the GHASH function, we focus on developing a secure and efficient binary field multiplication method. For SPA/TA resistance, we introduce concepts of Dummy XOR with the garbage registers and instruction level atomicity (ILA), and present a secure binary field multiplication method using these concepts. The proposed field multiplication method provides substantially improved performance by about 51.86% as compared with the latest related works while providing TA/SPA resistance. Furthermore, we propose an efficient multiplicative masking method which can defend DPA/CPA during the process of the GHASH function. The proposed masked GHASH function also provides much improved performance compared with the latest related works. Through SPA/TA and DPA/CPA experiments, we prove the comprehensive SCA security of the proposed methods. In the future, we will extend the basic block size in the proposed Block-Comb method from 32-bit to 64-bit. By extending the block size, we expect that the number of partial products for computing a 128-bit binary field multiplication can be significantly reduced, which contributes to enhancing the overall performance of the GHASH function. Furthermore, we apply our method on 16-bit and 32-bit embedded microcontrollers such as MSP430 and ARM processors. 
